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TARGETING AFTER KOSOVO
Has the Law Changed for Strike Planners?
Colonel Frederic L. Borch, U.S. Army
Recent reports published by Amnesty International1 and Human RightsWatch2 charge that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1999 air op-
erations against Serbia—Operation ALLIED FORCE3—selected and attacked tar-
gets in violation of the law of armed conflict.4 While the two high-profile
organizations clearly supported NATO’s goal of stopping the bloodshed in
Kosovo, both reports were sharply critical of some NATO combat operations.
Both claimed, for example, that an air strike on a Ser-
bian radio and television station during the campaign
was illegal because it was “a direct attack on a civilian
object.” Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch further charge that the bombing of two bridges
was unlawful because too many civilians were on or
near the structures during the attack. Finally, both
groups contend that the deaths of civilians during
NATO attacks on military targets necessarily meant
that NATO had failed to obey the law’s mandate to min-
imize harm to noncombatants. According to Amnesty
International, “NATO forces did commit serious vio-
lations of the laws of war leading in a number of cases
to the unlawful killings of civilians.”5 Similarly, Hu-
man Rights Watch declared that NATO “illegitimate”
attacks on nonmilitary targets resulted in excessive
civilian casualties.6 If these and other allegations are
true, General Wesley K. Clark, the regional commander
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responsible for the conduct of ALLIED FORCE, as well as the NATO planners who se-
quenced and synchronized the operation, violated the law—and incurred both per-
sonal liability and state responsibility for NATO members and the United States.
Additionally, if the charges are true, commanders and their planners cannot look to
ALLIED FORCE as a model for targeting in future military operations.7
So, what is the truth? Is it illegal to attack a government-owned television sta-
tion? Must a commander instruct a pilot to refrain from attacking a bridge if ci-
vilians can be seen on it? Are commanders and their planners responsible if a
large number of civilians are killed during an attack? This article concludes, after
examining the law relating to targeting and analyzing the facts and circum-
stances surrounding targets that, allegedly, were illegally attacked, that Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch are wrong, on two grounds. In some in-
stances the facts do not support their claims; where the facts are not in dispute,
the two groups have drawn conclusions based on faulty interpretations of exist-
ing international law.
NATO selected and attacked legitimate military objectives in the Kosovo cam-
paign. The methods and weapons it used to destroy or neutralize these targets
were lawful and proportional to the military advantage expected. Finally, NATO
distinguished between combatants and noncombatants and took proper pre-
cautions to avoid injuring or killing noncombatants.
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE
In 1998, Serbian military and police forces flooded into Kosovo and began sys-
tematically driving ethnic Albanians from their homes. Roughly 250,000
Kosovars were forced to flee; most of these refugees escaped to neighboring Al-
bania and Macedonia, but the Serbs killed hundreds of men, women, and chil-
dren in this act of “ethnic cleansing.”8 When diplomatic efforts advanced by
Germany, France, and Italy did not lead to a negotiated settlement with the pres-
ident of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY),9 Slobodan Milosevic,10 the
United States and its NATO allies decided that only military action would stop the
aggression. On 24 March 1999, after talks at Rambouillet, in France, failed to
stop Serbian violence against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, NATO launched Oper-
ation ALLIED FORCE. In a seventy-eight-day “phased” air operation, aircraft from
thirteen (out of nineteen) NATO member states flew combat sorties against tar-
gets in the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, Serbia proper, and Montenegro.
Ninety of every hundred bombs used in NATO’s attacks on airfields; air defense
emplacements; bridges; command, control, and communication sites; and police
and troop barracks were precision-guided munitions (PGMs)—a significant
fact when one considers that PGMs constituted only 9 percent of bombs
dropped in DESERT STORM.11 In addition to these aircraft-delivered PGMs,
B O R C H 6 5
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss2/7
long-range cruise missiles fired by the United States and the United Kingdom
were used to hit similar targets. The goal of ALLIED FORCE was “to halt or disrupt
a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing.”12 The means of reaching this end state
were chosen on the basis of the belief that a gradual increase in force and intensity
would cause Milosevic to halt the aggression in Kosovo.13 By the time ALLIED
FORCE ended, NATO had flown more than 38,400 sorties and released 23,600 air
munitions against over nine hundred targets.
Commentators disagree “about
exactly what caused Milosevic to ac-
cept NATO’s conditions.”14 He may
have capitulated because he was po-
litically isolated and realized that he
could not undermine the alliance’s
unity and sense of purpose. On the
other hand, since Serbian army and
police forces had killed or expelled
most Muslim Kosovars by early June
1999, he might have acquiesced be-
cause he had achieved his objectives.
Whatever Milosevic’s reasons, the
fact remains that at the end of NATO’s
air operation, Serbian forces had
ceased their ethnic cleansing opera-
tions in Kosovo.15
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND TARGET SELECTION
Under the law of armed conflict, all persons, places, and things may be targeted
if they are military objectives. As Article 52(2) of the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva Conventions explains, military objectives are “objects which by their na-
ture, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circum-
stances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”16 Even if a per-
son, place, or thing qualifies as a military objective, however, that does not mean
that it may be attacked using any imaginable method. Rather, only lawful weap-
ons may be employed.17 Additionally, any attack on a military objective must be
necessary to accomplish a military purpose. By way of example, an enemy fighter
jet is a military objective, but if it cannot be flown because it is parked in the
middle of a city neighborhood miles away from a runway, bombing it is arguably
unlawful, because it would not accomplish a military purpose.
6 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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While noncombatants and civilian property may never be directly targeted,
the law recognizes that an attack on an otherwise lawful military objective may
cause incidental injury and damage to civilians and their property. There are,
however, limits on such incidental or collateral damage. In the words of Article
57(2) of Protocol I, it must not “be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated” (emphasis supplied) from targeting the military
objective. That is, collateral damage not only must be minimized but may not be
disproportionate to any military gain. The law of armed conflict requires attackers
to respect this principle of proportionality by demanding that they “at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives.”18
Since the adoption of Protocol I in 1977, the principles of distinction and
proportionality have become increasingly important in the selection and attack
of targets. For example, it is now generally accepted that “even a legitimate target
may not be attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportion-
ate to the specific military gain from the attack.”19 Thus, for example, massive
bombing of the type used by the World War II Allies against Dresden is no lon-
ger lawful—principally because the tens of thousands of German civilians killed
was excessive when balanced against the military need to destroy the German
railway network in that city. Additionally, the bombing accuracy resulting from
the development of PGMs has brought with it a significant reduction in collat-
eral damage. As a result, while the law of armed conflict has not changed—there
is no legal requirement to use PGMs, and injuring civilians and their property is
lawful if incidental to an otherwise legal attack on a military objective—plan-
ners and operators choosing between laser-guided ordnance or “dumb” bombs
now more than ever must consider collateral damage. What constitutes “exces-
sive” collateral damage ultimately is very much affected by the subjective
mind-set of the commander in charge of an operation or campaign.20
Lawful military objectives that almost always satisfy the “military necessity”
test include enemy aircraft, vehicles, and warships; naval and military bases;
warship construction and repair facilities; military storage depots; airfields,
ports, and harbors; troop concentrations and embarkation points; and lines of
communication. Lawful targets also include dual-use objects like bridges,
railheads, road networks, and similar transportation infrastructure used both
by civilians and by enemy armed forces. For example, a power-generating sta-
tion that supplies electricity both to military structures (e.g., command and
control node or air defense site) and public facilities (such as a civilian hospital
or school) may be attacked if military necessity requires it.21 Again, however, re-
gardless of the legitimacy of selecting and attacking a target, collateral damage to
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noncombatants and their property must not be disproportionate to the military
advantage achieved in destroying or neutralizing the target. An electrical power
grid may be targeted if the effect that the loss of power will have on nonmilitary
facilities is not excessive when balanced against the advantage gained by remov-
ing that energy source from the enemy’s military forces.
Finally, because the law of armed conflict requires that “constant care shall be
taken to spare the civilian population” from the effects of military operations,
noncombatants near a legitimate military target must be warned of an impend-
ing bombardment. In the language of Article 57(2)(c) of Protocol I, “effective
warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless
circumstances do not permit.” This provision is understood to mean that a
warning may be general in nature; it need not be specific if this would jeopardize
the success of the mission. Even then, only “reasonable efforts” to warn are re-
quired by law.22
Finally, in targeting a legitimate military objective, attackers may use meth-
ods that safeguard their own forces, provided they otherwise comply with the
law of armed conflict. In ALLIED FORCE, for example, NATO pilots avoiding Yugo-
slav air defenses dropped ordnance from a “safe” altitude of fifteen thousand
feet. This was entirely lawful. First, at least in regard to attacks on fixed targets,
delivering precision-guided munitions from this height actually furthered the
principle of distinction, because it gave an aircraft more time—undisturbed by
flak or surface-to-air missiles—to acquire the object being attacked and guide
the weapon to it. On the other hand, the fifteen-thousand-foot altitude did
make it arguably harder to minimize collateral damage when attacking moving
or nonfixed targets. On balance, however, NATO’s decision to protect the force
was lawful; it did not violate the principle of distinction.23
In sum, the law of armed conflict requires that each target satisfy the defini-
tion of military objective; that the means selected in attacking the target be pro-
portional to the military advantage gained; and that incidental damage to
civilians and their property be minimized.24 To ensure that every U.S. military
operation follows these legal requirements,25 judge advocates are integrated into
military planning and operations at all levels and a military lawyer reviews every
target for “legal sufficiency” prior to any attack.26
SPECIFIC TARGETS ATTACKED IN ALLIED FORCE
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch claim that NATO’s attacks on at
least five targets were unlawful because either the targets were not lawful military
objectives; or the attack accomplished no “definite military advantage”; or the
bombardment resulted in excessive and disproportionate collateral damage.27
6 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Laser-Guided Bomb Attack on the Grdelica Railway Bridge
On 12 April 1999, an American F-15E Strike Eagle launched a laser-guided
bomb to destroy a railway bridge in Grdelica, Serbia. While the bomb was on its
way to the target, a passenger train came onto the bridge; the bomb hit the train
rather than the bridge. As General Clark explained at a press conference on 13
April, the pilot realized that he had missed his target. Consequently, he “came back
around to try to strike a different point on the bridge because he was trying to do
[his] job, to take the bridge down.”28 Taking aim “at the opposite end [of the
bridge] from where the train had come,” the pilot launched a second PGM. By this
time, however, the train had moved—and it was hit again. Some ten civilians in
the train were killed and “at least” fifteen injured.29
NATO planners had selected the Grdelica bridge for attack because it was part
of a resupply route for Serb forces in Kosovo; Amnesty International and Hu-
man Rights Watch acknowledge that this military use made it a legitimate target.
Nonetheless, these organizations claimed in their reports that the attack was ille-
gal for two reasons. First, NATO had violated the principle of distinction when the
F-15E pilot did not delay his attack while there was “civilian traffic” on the
bridge.”30 Second, NATO had violated the principle of proportionality because the
civilian deaths were “excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.”31
In essence, Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch charge
that as there was no need to attack
the bridge at that particular moment—the structure could have been destroyed
ten minutes later, when the passenger train was safely across—the bombard-
ment violated the principle of proportionality.
Under the law of armed conflict, Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch are correct that it was unlawful to attack the Grdelica bridge while a pas-
senger train was on it. While the bridge was a legitimate target, it could have
been attacked when free of civilian train traffic; there is no evidence that the
mission’s success would have been jeopardized if the aircraft had returned later.
That said, the groups’ legal conclusions are irrelevant, as the facts show that the
F-15E pilot and weapons systems officer did not know that the train was on the
bridge until it was too late to prevent collateral damage from the first bomb. As
General Clark explained, the pilot launched his first laser-guided bomb while
still “many miles” from the target, from where he “was not able to put his eyes on
the bridge.” Over the next few minutes, as their aircraft closed on the Grdelica
bridge at very high speed, the pilot and weapons systems officer tracked the
bomb’s trajectory on a five-inch video screen; all seemed in order. Then, “at the
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very last instant with less than a second to go,” the train came upon the bridge
and was struck.32 It is apparent that there was no intent to harm civilians with the
first electro-optical guided bomb. Moreover, the crew intended its second bomb
to hit a point on the bridge some distance away from the train; that it in fact
struck the train was likewise an accident.
An independent investigation conducted by the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) confirmed NATO’s claims that the civil-
ian deaths and injuries at Grdelica had been unintended.33 The lesson to be
learned is that while military operations must be conducted in accordance with
the law of armed conflict, criminal responsibility requires either an intent to vio-
late the law or a reckless disregard of it. Consequently, an attacker who acts rea-
sonably in bombing an otherwise legitimate target has a defense against the
charge that excessive collateral damage occurred. What happened at Grdelica
was a tragic accident, not the result of intentional or reckless conduct; the re-
gional commander and his planners bore no command or individual responsi-
bility for it.34
Bombing of the Refugees on the Djakovica Road
On 14 April 1999, for about two hours in the afternoon, NATO F-16 and Jaguar
aircraft attacked two vehicle convoys traveling on the Djakovica Road in Kosovo.
The convoys had been targeted because NATO believed they carried Serb special
police forces that had been setting fire to houses in order to drive Albanian
Kosovars from their homes. The targets were identified and ordnance released
from an altitude of fifteen thousand feet, for reasons explained above. The attack
was successful, in that many vehicles in the convoys were destroyed or badly
damaged. At some point during the bombing, however, NATO learned that the
convoy might comprise “a mix of military and civilian vehicles”; wanting to
avoid collateral damage to civilians, it suspended the attack until more was
known. It was too late—some seventy civilian men, women, and children had
been killed and about a hundred injured. Most of the vehicles in the convoy
turned out to have been farm tractors.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports charged that the at-
tack was unlawful on the ground that NATO’s concerns with protecting its own
pilots had caused it to ignore the principle of distinction.35 That is, by flying at fif-
teen thousand feet to avoid surface-to-air missiles, NATO attackers had been unable
to distinguish between military objectives and noncombatants and their property.
NATO countered that as the pilots had believed they were seeing and attacking
military vehicles, the civilian deaths and injuries were accidental.
Was the bombing of the Djakovica road refugees a war crime? No. The F-16
and Jaguar pilots thought they were attacking military vehicles belonging to FRY
7 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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special police units conducting ethnic cleansing. The danger to them from en-
emy air defenses made it reasonable to attack from fifteen thousand feet. Finally,
while civilians were killed, their deaths were not the result of an intentional or
reckless failure to honor the principle of distinction. Just as it had after the
Grdelica incident, the ICTY concluded that NATO had not acted improperly at
Djakovica: “While this incident is one where it appears the aircrews could have
benefited from lower altitude scrutiny of the target at an early stage, the commit-
tee is of the opinion that neither the aircrew nor their commanders displayed the
degree of recklessness in failing to take precautionary measures which would
sustain criminal charges.”36
While NATO was cleared of wrongdoing at Djakovica, the committee’s lan-
guage suggested that there was a bombing altitude—somewhere above fifteen
thousand feet—at which ALLIED FORCE aircraft would have been acting with
criminal recklessness. Attackers may not adopt self-protection measures that so
reduce their ability to honor the principle of distinction that a reasonable per-
son would view them as reckless. At what “line” the reasonable becomes reckless,
however, is most difficult to determine. But if NATO’s self-protection measures
had made its pilots unable to distinguish between combatants and noncom-
batants, these measures would have made it difficult—if not impossible—to
carry out any lawful attacks.
Attack on the Lunane Bridge
On 1 May 1999, in the middle of the day, NATO warplanes bombed the Lunane
Bridge in Kosovo. Apparently the bridge itself suffered only minimal damage,
but a civilian bus on the bridge during the attack was blown in half. An unknown
number of civilians were killed.37
No one—not even Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch—dis-
putes that the bridge was a legitimate military objective; it was on the main re-
supply road between Nis, Serbia’s second-largest city, and Pristina, the capital of
Kosovo. Rather, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch charged that
NATO had violated the law of armed conflict in that the alliance “did not take the
precautionary steps necessary to avoid civilian casualties.” The two organiza-
tions insist that NATO could have attacked the bridge at night, when civilian traf-
fic across it was reduced. Alternatively, the two groups argue, by attacking the
bridge when a civilian bus was crossing it, the NATO pilots ignored the presence
of noncombatants and disregarded the principles of distinction and propor-
tionality. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reasoned that if NATO
had been conducting aerial operations in accordance with the law of armed con-
flict, its pilots would necessarily have seen the bus; realizing that attacking the
bridge at that moment likely would result in excessive collateral damage, they
B O R C H 7 1
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would have halted the attack and resumed it only after the bus had crossed the
bridge to safety.
Did NATO violate the law because its attack on a legitimate military objective
also resulted in civilian casualties? It did not. At a 2 May 1999 press conference, a
NATO spokesman explained that the bus had crossed the bridge “after weapons
release” and that there had been no intent to target it. Interestingly, when asked if
NATO could conduct its attacks on bridges at night—so as to minimize the dan-
ger to civilian buses and trains—the spokesman said, “We did not target the bus
as we have not targeted earlier the train. We target bridges, and I am sure that the
Serb authorities know that these bridges are of extreme value to their lines of com-
munications and [that] when they allow public traffic over these bridges, then
they risk a lot of lives of their own citizens.”38
The reference to the Grdelica train indicates that NATO viewed the Lunane
Bridge as a similar situation—the attacking pilots had intended to destroy a le-
gitimate military objective. That their ordnance struck a bus was an accident.
NATO further maintained that if the damage to the bus and injury to its passen-
gers was in fact accidental, as explained, it had not violated the law of armed con-
flict; on the contrary, it was, arguably, the Yugoslav government that had done
so, as it had no doubt understood that the bridge was a lawful military objective.
Article 58(c) of Protocol I requires government officials to take “necessary pre-
cautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian ob-
jects under their control against the dangers resulting from military
operations.”39 By allowing its citizens to use transportation facilities that were al-
most certain to be attacked, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had put their
lives at risk. At Lunane the consequences were tragic.
Missile Attack on Serbian Radio and Television Station
On 23 April 1999, U.S. missiles40 struck the downtown Belgrade studios of a Serbian-
owned radio and television station.41 The facility housed commercial telephone,
fiber-optic cable, high-frequency radio, and microwave communication equip-
ment. It was connected with more than a hundred radio relay sites in Yugosla-
via—forming a network that was principally civilian but that NATO intelligence
had determined was integrated with the government’s strategic and operational
command and control structure. As NATO officials were to explain at a press con-
ference after the attack, “military traffic [had been] routed through the civilian sys-
tem,” and the station’s equipment had been used “to support the activities of FRY
military and special police forces.”42
On about 12 April, NATO issued a general warning43 to Western media outlets
that the radio and television station might be attacked, and in turn the Belgrade
government learned of the fact from media reports. When the facility was not
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immediately bombed, however, Belgrade apparently discounted the warning
and failed to inform the station’s staff .44 Consequently, when NATO ordnance hit
the facility, between ten and seventeen civilians—technicians, security workers,
and makeup artists—were killed, and about the same number wounded.45
According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the attack
“was a deliberate attack on a civilian object and as such constitutes a war
crime.”46 They argued in their reports that as the station transmitted civilian
programming only, it had not made “an effective contribution to military ac-
tion” and so could not have been a proper military objective. Additionally, the
groups charged that bombing the facility had been illegal because, even if it sat-
isfied the military objective test, its destruction would not give NATO the “defi-
nite military advantage” required by Article 52(2) of Protocol I. The fact the
station had been back in operation within hours and had not been reattacked,
they argued, necessarily meant that it had little military utility. Amnesty Inter-
national and Human Rights Watch further maintain that the attack was illegal
because the number of civilians killed in the attack had been excessive in relation
to any military advantage gained.47
Was it lawful to target the Serbian radio and television station? Yes. It had a
dual use; it broadcast civilian programming but also was an integral part of the
Yugoslav/Serbian military command and control network. This fact made it a
lawful military objective. The purpose in targeting it was to degrade the enemy’s
strategic and operational capabilities—the “definite military advantage” re-
quired by Protocol I. That the attack did not permanently neutralize enemy
command and control did not
make it any less legal. Finally, even
if one assumes for the sake of ar-
gument that the civilian casualties
were excessive, the true cause of
this collateral damage was not
NATO’s bombardment. On the contrary, the deaths and injuries resulted from
Belgrade’s failure to protect its own citizens in light of the warning received
some ten days earlier. If the Milosevic government had informed the station’s
employees that their workplace was a possible target, at least some of these civil-
ians would not have been in the building when it was hit;48 the missiles most
likely would have harmed no one.
One more issue deserves comment. Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain and
NATO officials suggested that propaganda broadcasts made by the radio and tele-
vision station had also justified its attack. Not surprisingly, Amnesty Interna-
tional and Human Rights Watch harshly criticized this view, claiming that there
is no legal basis for it. The committee of the International Criminal Tribunal for
B O R C H 7 3
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the Former Yugoslavia examining the matter agreed that this rationale probably
could not be the sole basis for an attack. The committee, however, determined
that NATO’s attack had nonetheless been lawful; its propaganda justification had
been “an incidental (albeit complementary) aim of its primary goal of disabling
the Serbian military command and control system.” However, the committee
cautioned that had the station gone beyond broadcasting propaganda and actu-
ally urged its listeners to kill Albanian Kosovars or engage in other crimes against
humanity, it would have become a lawful military objective.49
Bombardment of Korisa Village
During the night of 13–14 May 1999, three NATO aircraft dropped ten laser-
guided and gravity bombs on Korisa, a village on the highway between Prize and
Pristina. The primary target was a Serbian military camp and command post a
short distance from Korisa. NATO intelligence believed that there were no civil-
ians in the immediate area. In any event, the NATO pilots “visually identified” an
armored personnel carrier, ten artillery pieces, and “dug-in military revetted po-
sitions” prior to dropping their bombs.50 The attack on the military objective
was a success; however, the bombs also struck ethnic Albanian refugees living
nearby. A “relatively large number of civilians”—as many as fifty—were killed
and a roughly equal number injured.51 Subsequent investigations have not dis-
closed why these men, women, and children were present in the area. It may have
been simply fortuitous that they had encamped near the Korisa military camp.
There is, however, evidence that Serbian forces had forced refugees to remain
near their positions as “human shields.”52
While acknowledging that the military command post was a legitimate mili-
tary target and agreeing that it was a serious violation of the law to use the refu-
gees as human shields,53 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
nonetheless charged that NATO’s attack was unlawful. NATO’s pilots, they held,
had “failed to take sufficient precautionary measures to ascertain that there were
no civilians present” before they dropped their bombs. The high number of ci-
vilian casualties, the organizations maintained, had been excessive in relation to
the military gain—a violation of the principle of proportionality.54
The basic problem with the stance taken by Amnesty International and Hu-
man Rights Watch is that it does not comport with existing law. NATO forces at-
tacked a legitimate military objective. The facts that NATO intelligence officers
believed that no civilians were in the area and that the pilots saw none undercut
any conclusion that the civilian deaths resulted from any NATO failure. If the
commander authorizing the aerial attack and the officers planning it did not
know that there were civilians present—as they might well not know, in wartime
conditions—the law offers a “mistake of fact” defense. The history of warfare is
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replete with examples of “fog of war” producing unintended consequences—
especially harm to innocent civilian men, women, and children. While such
episodes are always regrettable, it does not necessarily follow that some person
or state is responsible for them. Not surprisingly, the ICTY committee investi-
gating the Korisa attack concluded that “credible information available is not
sufficient to tend to show that a crime . . . has been committed by the aircrew or
by superiors in the NATO chain of command.”55
HARD AND FAST RULES?
Roughly five hundred civilians were killed by the NATO air campaign in Kosovo.56
While this loss of life is both sad and lamentable, the ratio of sorties to civilian
deaths in that campaign was more than seventy-five to one. This ratio certainly
supports the conclusion that NATO tried to minimize casualties and conducted
ALLIED FORCE in accordance with the law of armed conflict.
For high-profile groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch, however, civilian casualties or other collateral damage will never be ac-
ceptable. Such organizations have the not-so-hidden agenda of promoting rules
that would make the legal conduct of war impossible, in order to end warfare
itself—at least by law-abiding states. Amnesty International, for example, insists
that an attacker has a “responsibility under international humanitarian law to take
all possible precautions to avoid harming civilians.”57 The law of armed conflict,
however, places no such requirement on combatants. Protocol I states clearly that
“civilians enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military opera-
tions”;58 this means that no crime has been committed if civilians are harmed in a
military attack if such injury is collateral and not disproportionate to the definite
military advantage gained.
Recognizing that “hard and fast rules” would advance their long-term goal,
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and others steadfastly insist that
the law of armed conflict is a collection of clear and unambiguous strictures. But
any rule is subject to subjective judgment, in terms of how it is applied to a par-
ticular set of circumstances. Thus, for example, there is no requirement for an
attacker to warn civilians near a target of the specific time and place of a future
attack. On the contrary, because it seeks to regulate rather than outlaw military
operations, the law of armed conflict requires only that “reasonable efforts” be
made to warn, and then only when the military situation permits. It is in the face
of this clear legal standard that Human Rights Watch insists that NATO “did not
take adequate precautions in warning civilians” prior to its attack on the Bel-
grade radio and television station.59
Applying the law of armed conflict is not like using a calculator to solve a
mathematical equation. On the contrary, because of the many subjective
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variables involved in military operations, the law necessarily requires that those
responsible apply and balance many factors both tangible and intangible. It fol-
lows that the claim that the law of armed conflict can be applied with precision is
dangerous, for two reasons. First, when groups like Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch claim that NATO committed war crimes, some individuals
and governments inevitably believe that it is true. This threatens to deprive the
United States and NATO of the moral high ground—an important component of
success. Further, if America’s friends believe that it selects and attacks targets in
violation of the law, they will stand aloof from future coalition operations in
which the United States participates—a direct threat to its national security
strategy of engagement. Second, such false claims could restrict the flexibility of
regional commanders in carrying out warfighting missions. If Amnesty Interna-
tional and Human Rights Watch repeat their allegations often enough, Con-
gress, the White House, and the Pentagon may ultimately accept them and
thereafter make target-related decisions on the basis of misinformation about
the law. It is critical that leaders at the strategic and operational levels of war un-
derstand that NATO’s attacks on targets in ALLIED FORCE were entirely lawful. The
law of armed conflict did not change before, during, or after the operation. Only
legitimate military objectives were targeted and attacked, and no collateral dam-
age occurred as a result of violations of the law.
Regional commanders and their planners can properly look to ALLIED FORCE
as a model for targeting in such campaigns in the future. They must choose law-
ful military objectives and plan legal attacks on those targets. But these com-
manders and operational planners—and the judge advocates serving them—
must be just as vigilant in countering those who would improperly restrict the
lawful waging of war.60
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